Consciousness vs. Soul

Why equating them obscures crucial distinctions.

Matthew Barnett recently tweeted:

"I genuinely think 'consciousness' is simply the modern, secular term for 'soul'. Both refer to unfalsifiable concepts used to determine who is in or out of our moral ingroup. Neither are empirical designations discovered through experiment, but socially constructed categories."

Barnett touches upon a genuinely insightful point: the social function of "consciousness" is indeed often analogous to historical uses of the term "soul." Both concepts have frequently been leveraged to mark boundaries of moral consideration, inclusion, or exclusion. The "soul" historically operated as a metaphysical criterion determining intrinsic worth or spiritual standing, and today "consciousness" occasionally performs a similar social role—particularly in ethical debates surrounding animals, AI, and patients in various medical states.

However, the equivalence breaks down fundamentally when we examine empirical foundations. Unlike the "soul," which by definition resists empirical scrutiny due to its explicitly metaphysical and dualist nature, consciousness is deeply intertwined with measurable, observable phenomena. Neuroscience routinely identifies correlates of conscious experience, ranging from neural signatures in functional MRI scans, EEG patterns during sleep and wakefulness, to empirically verifiable cognitive responses. Medical conditions such as anesthesia, comas, or minimally conscious states underscore this empirically grounded nature of consciousness, as these states can be tested, verified, and falsified through scientific methods.

Barnett's mistake is conflating the complexity and philosophical depth of consciousness—famously embodied in the "Hard Problem" articulated by philosopher David Chalmers—with intrinsic unfalsifiability. The difficulty of fully explaining how subjective experience arises from physical processes is not equivalent to the absence of empirical grounding. Consciousness may present significant scientific and philosophical challenges, but it remains empirically meaningful and testable in ways that "soul" never could.

Thus, while consciousness can indeed be misused socially as a tool for moral boundary-making, conflating this misuse with intrinsic metaphysical unfalsifiability is an error. Recognizing the distinction matters deeply for ethics, scientific inquiry, and philosophical clarity. Consciousness may be challenging philosophically, but unlike the concept of the "soul," it remains grounded in empirical investigation, inviting continued scientific and philosophical exploration.