Ludwig Wittgenstein famously argued in Philosophical Investigations that the concept of a "game" defies precise definition, relying instead on a network of overlapping similarities, which he termed "family resemblances." While Wittgenstein's insight highlights the complexity of common language concepts, I propose that a clear and operationally useful definition is achievable:
A game is any interactive process involving agents, where strategy—the deliberate selection among alternatives in pursuit of preferred outcomes—is salient.
This definition isolates four crucial elements:
Agency: The salience of strategy implies at least one agent capable of choice or decision-making. Without agency, strategic considerations collapse into deterministic inevitability or randomness.
Strategy: Strategy involves meaningful decision-making among alternatives, each evaluated by some criterion of desirability. This differentiates a game from purely deterministic or stochastic phenomena.
Interaction: Although commonly associated with multiple participants, even solitary interactions between an agent and an environment qualify. The environment itself can implicitly embody strategic dynamics.
Preferred Outcomes (Goals): Strategies must aim at achieving particular outcomes, whether these goals are explicitly articulated or implicitly understood.
Why Wittgenstein was Right—and Wrong
Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblance" aimed to capture how diverse phenomena, such as board games, sports, and language, share overlapping characteristics without fitting neatly under strict criteria. However, while acknowledging the complexity of language, Wittgenstein overlooked the power of general abstraction. My proposed definition does not require explicit enumeration of rules or scoring systems, thus avoiding Wittgenstein’s critique. Instead, it captures the essential strategic core common to all situations we meaningfully describe as "games."
Intelligence Defined Through Games
If intelligence is to be a meaningful and measurable concept, it must be understood relative to a defined context—a "game." Thus:
Intelligence is effectiveness at achieving goals within the constraints of a given game.
Understood this way, intelligence inherently involves agency and strategic decision-making. Different forms of intelligence—emotional, mathematical, social—can thus be viewed as proficiency in distinct implicit games:
Career Intelligence: The game involves economic competition, professional networking, and advancement.
Social Intelligence: Navigating implicit rules of cultural norms and social signaling.
Scientific Intelligence: Effective engagement with epistemic norms, research methodologies, and peer review.
Explicitly recognizing these implicit games clarifies debates around general versus domain-specific intelligence, as each type of intelligence corresponds directly to different strategic contexts.
Agency and Strategic Salience
The concept of "strategy" necessarily implies agency—entities capable of modeling outcomes and deliberately selecting actions. Even minimal organisms demonstrate agency through basic strategies (e.g., bacteria navigating chemical gradients), underscoring how widely applicable this definition is.
Addressing Potential Objections
"Games require multiple agents." Solitary interactions still involve strategic choices vis-à-vis the environment.
"Explicit rules are necessary." Rules can be implicit, emergent, or situationally defined.
"Wittgenstein's critique invalidates definitions." This minimalist, strategy-centric definition embraces complexity without sacrificing precision or clarity.
Conclusion
By explicitly defining intelligence relative to strategy-salient processes—games—we provide clear, meaningful criteria for assessing and comparing intelligence across varied domains. Recognizing and articulating implicit games enhances our conceptual clarity and philosophical rigor, offering practical guidance for fields as diverse as AI development, philosophy, education, and policy-making.
References
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, 1953.