Subjectivism vs. Moral Relativism
Clarifying the Difference
David Deutsch recently made a provocative statement:
"Physical and moral relativism deny that truth exists—and do so often with bad intent and always with bad consequences."
This sharp critique deserves careful unpacking—especially for those, like myself, who reject moral realism but who also explicitly reject relativism. The distinction here hinges crucially on understanding agent-binding subjectivism, a stance I've articulated and contrasted with relativism.
Relativism: Denial of Objective Truth
Moral relativism asserts there are no universally valid moral truths—morality is merely a product of cultural norms or subjective whims without objective rational grounding. Relativism implies that moral claims cannot be meaningfully judged or compared across different contexts or agents because there is no deeper standard by which to do so.
Deutsch is right to criticize this approach. Relativism undermines the possibility of coherent moral discourse, rational accountability, and meaningful ethical progress. Indeed, relativism can be weaponized to evade accountability and rational critique by insisting that no perspective can be meaningfully challenged from outside its own arbitrary framework.
Agent-binding Subjectivism
However, rejecting relativism does not necessarily mean embracing moral realism. My philosophical framework advocates agent-binding subjectivism, an approach grounded in two core principles:
Values are inherently subjective, arising directly from individual agents' preferences and goals.
Moral claims are objective only when explicitly bound to the vantage point of particular agents, thereby providing rigorous criteria for evaluation within clearly defined contexts.
This stance does not deny truth; rather, it clarifies truth's locus: each moral statement is conditionally true or false given an explicitly articulated set of subjective preferences and goals. For example, "X is morally wrong" translates precisely to, "Given my clearly defined values and preferences, X objectively conflicts with those."
Why Agent-binding Subjectivism Is Not Relativism
The critical difference between relativism and agent-binding subjectivism lies in maintaining the possibility of rigorous, rational evaluation:
Relativism dissolves all evaluative standards into arbitrary, culture-dependent or personally whimsical choices, refusing objective comparison.
Agent-binding subjectivism explicitly identifies the evaluative standard: the agent's own clearly articulated values. Thus, morality is not an arbitrary matter of convention but a precisely defined logical consequence of specific subjective foundations.
Subjectivism thus preserves rational accountability. Agents can be meaningfully criticized if their actions fail to align coherently with their explicitly defined preferences, goals, or commitments. Moral discourse remains robust, coherent, and objective—but always clearly contextualized and agent-bound.
Clarifying Our Philosophical Commitments
Deutsch rightly fears relativism's erosion of accountability and coherent ethical discourse. By contrast, agent-binding subjectivism preserves the rational structure and rigor Deutsch values but rejects moral realism's metaphysical claims about universal, agent-independent values.
The crucial takeaway is clarity: moral judgments become rigorous, objective, and evaluable precisely when we explicitly articulate the vantage from which those judgments are made. This perspective offers a middle ground—avoiding the epistemic incoherence of relativism and the metaphysical excesses of moral realism.
Agent-binding subjectivism, far from being relativist, is a clearly defined philosophical position that rigorously insists on both subjective foundations and conditional objectivity, securing the coherent moral accountability and truthfulness that Deutsch rightly defends.