You give the conditions for phenomenality as metabolism, systemic integration and causal closure, all of which are organizational properties. If those are what matter, an artificial system that metabolizes, maintains itself and closes its own causal loop would qualify, so artificial subjects are possible rather than "ontologically impossible." If "living" adds something beyond those properties, you haven't said what it is, and naming it would mean identifying the very property our article asks biological naturalists to identify. The case against Bostrom also needs intelligence to require interiority, a link that Seth, the leading defender of biological naturalism, explicitly rejects.
Not sure that plausible emergence can occur in synthetic systems, and an artificial computer system is not a good natural substrate for consciousness/intelligence.
https://truthandfreedom.life/superintelligence.html
You give the conditions for phenomenality as metabolism, systemic integration and causal closure, all of which are organizational properties. If those are what matter, an artificial system that metabolizes, maintains itself and closes its own causal loop would qualify, so artificial subjects are possible rather than "ontologically impossible." If "living" adds something beyond those properties, you haven't said what it is, and naming it would mean identifying the very property our article asks biological naturalists to identify. The case against Bostrom also needs intelligence to require interiority, a link that Seth, the leading defender of biological naturalism, explicitly rejects.
Not sure that plausible emergence can occur in synthetic systems, and an artificial computer system is not a good natural substrate for consciousness/intelligence.