Introduction
Coercion is typically understood as a violation of agency: the credible threat of harm to force compliance. In most cases, coercion is illegitimate because it narrows the authentic space of choice and substitutes fear for freedom. Yet not all coercion is unjustifiable. Within the Agency framework, there are contexts where coercion can be legitimate — not because it ceases to be coercion, but because it is pre-consented, defensive, or compensatory. By expanding the conceptual boundaries, we can see how coercion sometimes functions as a necessary instrument of justice rather than as an act of domination.
The Default: Coercion as Illegitimate
Illegitimate coercion consists of threats without consent, extortion, domination, or arbitrary exercise of power.
Effect: It distorts the agent’s ability to act freely by poisoning noncompliant options with negative utility. The victim still technically has choices, but the landscape is rigged against them.
Examples: “Do this or I’ll harm your family.” / “Pay me protection money or I’ll burn down your store.” These threats extract value by fear rather than voluntary exchange.
Illegitimate coercion is corrosive because it instrumentalizes another’s agency. It leaves the coerced agent with a formal appearance of choice but no real autonomy. In practice, it is indistinguishable from domination.
When Coercion is Justified
Voluntary Agreements
Contracts frequently involve coercive enforcement. If you fail to deliver payment, penalties apply. This is coercion, but it is pre-consented coercion. By signing the contract, you accepted conditional penalties in exchange for benefits.
The threat is not arbitrary; it is the predictable consequence of non-performance.
Example: Mortgage agreements or employment contracts that stipulate consequences for breach. The coercion here is legitimized by the agent’s own prior consent.
Governance and Rule of Law
In voluntary governance systems, rules are enforced coercively: break the rules, face fines or restrictions. The justification comes from prior consent to the system itself. Laws gain legitimacy when they are the outcome of voluntary participation or when exit from the system remains possible.
Key Distinction: Coercion becomes illegitimate when participation is involuntary or when exit is blocked. A just system must preserve meaningful alternatives.
Example: Community associations that enforce fines for rule-breaking, but which allow members to leave if they disagree with the structure.
Defensive and Protective Coercion
Warning an aggressor: “If you attack me, I will retaliate.” This is coercion, but justified as boundary-setting. It protects agency rather than undermines it. Here, the coercion serves as a deterrent that prevents greater harm.
Normative Basis: Defensive coercion is legitimate when it deters or prevents greater violations of agency. The goal is not domination but preservation.
Example: National deterrence strategies (“If you invade, we will respond with force”) or personal self-defense warnings. The coercion is credible but justified by its protective aim.
Restitution and Justice
Requiring restitution for harm done is coercion: “You must repay what you stole.” Yet it is justified because it restores lost agency to the victim. Coercion here is part of balancing the scales.
Universal Compensatory Justice: Legitimate coercion is anchored in restoring balance, not imposing domination. The coercive demand is to undo an earlier coercion or act of violence.
Example: Court-ordered compensation to victims of fraud or theft. Although coercive, it realigns agency by restoring what was taken.
What Coercion Cannot Justify
Preemptive domination: “Obey me or else,” without prior agreement or defensive rationale. This treats others as property rather than agents.
Exploitation: Using threats to extract value that was never consented to. Even if both parties benefit in the short term, the coercion remains illegitimate if it rests on intimidation.
Collective excuses: Invoking the “greater good” does not by itself justify coercion. Appeals to utility cannot override the primacy of agency. Coercion justified only by aggregate welfare calculations is still coercion without consent.
Illegitimate coercion is precisely what gives rise to tyranny and abuse. Without clear boundaries, the language of justification becomes a cover for domination.
Broader Implications
Understanding when coercion is justified matters because it allows us to:
Defend strong free speech: Threats can be distinguished from protected speech by whether they constitute coercion.
Clarify rights enforcement: Rights are not free-floating abstractions; they are preferences we enforce by coercion. Justification comes from voluntary consent to enforcement mechanisms.
Design ethical governance: Systems of law and order that rely on coercion must be structured so that exit is possible, consent is meaningful, and enforcement is restorative rather than exploitative.
Preserve agency: Coercion, in its justified form, protects or restores agency. In its illegitimate form, it annihilates it. The line between the two is the difference between justice and tyranny.
Conclusion
Coercion is generally illegitimate because it narrows agency by threat rather than by choice.
But coercion can be justified when:
It is pre-consented (contracts, voluntary governance).
It is defensive (deterring aggression, protecting agency).
It is compensatory (restoring lost agency through restitution).
In the Agency framework, coercion remains coercion — a narrowing of options by threat — but in these cases, it operates as a tool for justice rather than as an instrument of domination. The challenge is vigilance: ensuring that justified coercion does not slide imperceptibly into illegitimate coercion. Drawing and maintaining this boundary is central to any coherent theory of freedom.