When To Kill A Project
How Voluntary Support Separates Worthy Goals from Wasteful Ones
A common belief is that certain projects—public infrastructure, scientific research, education—possess intrinsic or objective value, such that they deserve funding even if no individual voluntarily chooses to fund them. This assumption, however, implicitly embraces an objective theory of value, claiming some projects have worth independent of subjective human preferences. For clarity, by "project," we mean any endeavor pursued toward a goal, of any scale—from personal objectives to large-scale collective initiatives.
Yet, let's challenge this assumption explicitly:
"A project can have greater inherent value than the sum of individual valuations."
I propose rejecting this premise entirely. The alternative, consistent with subjectivist value theory, is that:
"The value of a project is precisely the sum total of individual valuations—no more, no less."
Why the Assumption is Flawed
Violates Subjectivist Value: Value arises from individual preferences. Without subjective evaluation by actual agents, value literally doesn't exist. To assert inherent value independent of subjective evaluation is philosophically incoherent.
Confuses Benefit with Actual Value: Projects might theoretically benefit people, but unless people explicitly value (through voluntary support or credible intention), this benefit remains speculative. Potential, hypothetical preferences do not equate to actual valuations.
Relies on Hidden Objective Standards: Asserting a project as inherently valuable presupposes some external, objective measure. But such objectivity doesn't exist independent of subjective human perspectives. This undermines ethical coherence.
Addressing Common Counterarguments
"People undervalue due to ignorance or cognitive biases."
Indeed, people might undervalue certain outcomes due to limited information or biases. The ethically consistent response is education or persuasion—not coercion.
"Future generations may value differently."
True, but speculative future preferences of nonexistent people cannot justify coercive funding today. Today's decisions ethically depend only on current, actual valuations.
"Collective-action problems prevent accurate valuation."
Genuine collective-action problems are real, but they represent structural incentives, not inherent value discrepancies. Voluntary solutions like assurance contracts or crowdfunding can resolve these issues without contradicting subjective valuation.
Clarifying the Ethical Stance
Rejecting objective valuation strengthens philosophical coherence and clarifies ethical action:
"If a project isn't voluntarily funded, it's simply not valuable enough—by definition—to pursue."
This position explicitly respects individual agency, aligns perfectly with voluntarist ethics, and clearly distinguishes ethical legitimacy from practical challenges.
Conclusion
Rejecting inherent valuation beyond subjective preferences provides clear ethical boundaries, respects agency, and coherently resolves the tension between hypothetical benefit and actual value. Value is precisely the sum of subjective individual valuations—nothing more, nothing less.