Redistribution through taxation and welfare programs is often defended by appealing to compassion, fairness, or social justice. But a critical question is frequently overlooked: does the method of redistribution itself cause harm?
Under our philosophical framework, harm is defined explicitly as a reduction of agency, typically through coercion—defined as the credible threat of actual harm used to gain compliance. By this definition, coercive redistribution—enforced through threats such as imprisonment or fines—is inherently harmful because it reduces the agency of those from whom resources are taken.
The intention behind coercive redistribution—to alleviate poverty or address inequalities—is irrelevant to whether coercion itself is harmful. Compassionate intentions do not erase the harm done to those coerced. Moreover, the concept of "net good" cannot ethically justify imposing harm on individuals. Our ethical framework rejects the notion that benefiting one group justifies harming another.
This does not imply ignoring poverty or deprivation. Rather, it calls for addressing these issues through voluntary, consent-based methods. Voluntary redistribution—such as charity, mutual aid, and opt-in social safety nets—respects agency, upholds consent, and avoids the ethical pitfalls of coercion.
Coercive redistribution also risks distorting incentives. It discourages voluntary charity, creates dependency, and can even reduce overall productivity and innovation by penalizing success. When coercion is removed from the equation, voluntary solutions arise naturally, preserving incentives and promoting genuine solidarity.
In short, coercive redistribution is always harmful—not because helping others is wrong, but because coercion itself inherently reduces agency and violates ethical integrity. It is not compassionate to fund charity through extortion. True compassion respects voluntary action and agency, seeking solutions free from the threat of force.