The Defending Bayes Sequence
From probability to philosophy of mind.
This sequence anchors Axio’s epistemology: a defense of Bayesian reasoning not as mere statistical machinery but as the logic of belief in a branching universe. It extends from physics to philosophy of mind, demonstrating how rational agents maintain coherence across uncertainty, timelines, and quantum branches.
Defending Bayes (Part 1)
Bayesianism within the Quantum Branching Universe.
Introduces priors, credence, and Vantage within QBU, establishing how subjective belief (credence) relates to objective measure across timelines.
Defending Bayes, Part 2
The necessity of Bayesian updating.
Defends Bayes’ theorem as the only coherent rule for rational belief revision, countering objections from Deutsch and Hall.
Defending Bayes, Part 3
Theories aren’t probabilities—but beliefs are.
Clarifies that scientific theories should not be assigned probabilities; only our credences about their predictions are probabilistic.
Defending Bayes, Part 4
Irreducible uncertainty and the vantage problem.
Explores Yudkowsky’s insight on irreducible uncertainty and connects it to standing across multiple vantage points in QBU.
Defending Bayes, Part 5
Four forms of uncertainty.
Distinguishes logical, empirical, indexical, and timeline uncertainty—clarifying where Bayesian reasoning applies and where it must be extended.
Defending Bayes, Part 6
Logical induction and conceptual credence.
Separates empirical randomness from conceptual uncertainty, connecting Bayesian credence with the Logical Induction framework.
Defending Bayes, Part 7
Reconciling Popper and Bayes.
Argues that while theories themselves aren’t probabilistic, belief updates about evidence still must obey Bayesian norms.
Defending Bayes, Part 8
Measure and credence unified.
Integrates objective Measure (world frequencies) and subjective Credence (agent updates) within the Quantum Branching Universe.
Defending Bayes, Part 9 (Interlude)
Measure vs. Credence clarified.
Summarizes the distinction between objective and subjective probability, unifying Bayesianism with Axio’s decision theory and QBU semantics.